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This paper connects hitherto distant strands of literature to contribute to the ongoing turn to 
value theory in socio-ecological studies. Starting from Marx’s understanding of value as social 
form, I revisit Neil Smith’s contribution to the question of value and nature and argue for a 
reassessment of the internal relations between valorisation and the ‘vernacular’ dimensions of 
socio-ecological reproduction. I approach this problem through Bolívar Echeverría’s 
reconstruction of the category of use-value and his understanding of the pivotal role it plays in 
Marx’s critique, which allows for an open and non-reductive account of the subsumption of 
socio-ecologies under capitalism as contradictory entanglements of abstraction and meaning. 
The paper mobilises these insights alongside Marxian-inspired anthropological theories of 
value—the work of Terence Turner and David Graeber—in order to sketch elements for a 
symbolic-materialist framework to approach the question of value in its cultural-moral register, 
its relation to value as economic form, and issues of moral economy and ecology under 
capitalism. 
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I. Introduction 
What does it mean to think about our relation to nature through the lens of value? This is the 
question animating the recent and ongoing turn to value theory within critical ecological studies in 
geography and beyond (e.g. Kay and Kenney-Lazar, 2017; Kenney-Lazar and Kay, 2017; Huber, 2016; 
Andreucci et al., 2017; Arboleda, 2019; Christophers, 2016; Robertson ‡ and Wainwright, 2013; 
Purcell et al., 2019; Kallis and Swyngedouw, 2018; Greco and Apostolopoulou, 2019). And indeed, 
beyond academic debates, from the rarefied spheres of the world-system’s financial centres, to its 
often-bloody frontiers of extraction, talk of value and worth saturates the fraught geographies of 
capitalism’s socio-ecological reproduction. Whether the variegated and compounding 
transformations in nature compelled by capital accumulation are productive or destructive, whether 
they create wealth or inflict misery—all of these controversies constitute a political field in which 
what is ultimately at stake are the forms of value that define the very meaning of these dichotomies; 
the different and contesting conceptions of the desirable that mediate our relation to nature, and 
each other. Perhaps the ubiquity of struggles over what value is, especially when we speak of nature, 
only attest to the cultural depth of the crisis of liberal-capitalist hegemony, as it confronts its 
catastrophic unfolding as part of natural history (Wainwright and Mann, 2018; Moore, 2015).  
In this context, as Kay and Kenney-Lazar (2017) note, the concept of ‘value’ may hold an 
enormous potential to be developed as an “organizing framework” for geographical inquiry on the 
ongoing capitalist organisation, production, and destruction of nature, and on the multiple 
resistances immanent to these processes. In this sense, recent reengagements with Marx’s value 
theory can only be welcomed—as Huber (2016) notes, relative to the proliferation of empirical 
studies on the ‘valuation of nature’, engagements with the theoretical grounds on which the 
concept is mobilised remain conspicuously rare (cf. Robertson and Wainwright, 2013). While these 
debates show, at the very least, the generative potential of renewing discussions of Marx’s core 
concept in relation to nature, they also show how the value-nature relation, still far from 
constituting shared framework of analysis, appears rather as an open field of questions, divergent 
readings, and disagreements. Among other things, they show widely different understandings of 
what Marxian value theory is about, of what, if any, ecological significance it holds, and of the nature 
of the relation between the word’s different semantic registers—value as measure, value as 
economic form-determination, and value as moral-cultural category (e.g. Bigger and Robertson, 
2017; Kay and Kenney-Lazar, 2017: 304-306). 
In this paper I want to connect hitherto geographically and disciplinarily distant strands of 
literature in the hope of shedding new light on these and other questions that have recently 
emerged around the ecological dimensions of Marxian value theory. As is the case with the field of 
political ecology in general (Loftus, 2017), and value-nature relations in particular (Sullivan, 2017: 
312), a broadening of the disciplinary and geographical scope of these debates can infuse much 
needed new perspectives.  
It is worth noting that among the most common criticisms of Marx’s value theory to re-
emerge in these recent discussions is that of anthropocentrism, of how the understanding of value 
as constituted by abstract human labour renders the theory ill-suited, at best, to understand the 
role of nature in capitalism (e.g. Walker, 2017; Kallis and Swyngedouw, 2018). Relatedly, other 
criticisms take aim at the purported ‘economistic’ nature of Marxian value theory, which would fail 
to account for the importance of the different forms of value and meaning mediating the social 
relation to nature—values which, in the Marxian framework, would be reduced to the allegedly 
economistic and utilitarian notion of use-value (e.g. Gudynas, 2019). While these lines of criticism 
arguably hold for a good deal of ‘traditional’ readings Marx (see Elbe, 2013; Postone, 1993), in my 
view they fail to acknowledge the ways in which Marx’s value theory fundamentally departed from 
the classical labour theory of value, and indeed is to be read most productively as a fundamental 
critique of the “categorical presuppositions” of the entire field of political economy (Heinrich, 2012: 
32-36). In other words, to understand the ecological significance of Marx’s value theory it is 
fundamental to read it as critique—one that, far from reaffirming capitalism’s anthropocentric and 
economistic ontology, precisely provides the grounds for its radical materialist critique as an 
ontology rooted in, and reproduced through, the historically situated social forms that articulate 
socio-ecological reproduction under the capitalist mode of production.  
In this sense, and drawing from different strands of critical readings of Marx1, this paper 
starts from an understanding of Marx’s value theory as a radical critique of, on the one hand, the 
real abstraction of the practical, embodied, and variegated human entanglement with nature into 
“human labour in the abstract” (Marx, 1990: 128)—or ‘labour’ as purely generic human activity—
and, on the other, the concomitant subsumption of socio-ecological reproduction under the 
compulsions of its own fetishistic inversion in the form of a “phantom-“ and “vampire-like” (Marx 
1990:128, 342) field of economic objectivity—i.e. capital. And it is on the contradiction-ridden 
dynamics of this condition that Marxian value theory opens what in my view remains a unique 
avenue of inquiry: the critique of political economy, of value, as “a social”—and ecological—
“critique of economic inversion” (Bonefeld, 2018: 123), a critique of the specific social forms—value, 
money, commodity, profit, wage, etc.—through which the “social life-process” is constituted in the 
capitalist mode of production, and as an analysis of the contradictions that beset the historical 
unfolding of this condition. In this sense, far from economistic, Marx’s theory provides the grounds 
for a radical critique of ‘economic objectivity’ itself as a historically specific social form of socio-
ecological reproduction, characterised by the irreducible contradiction between the qualitative, 
embodied dimensions of life, and its subsumption under the overbearing demands of its 
quantitative abstraction as infinitely expanding magnitudes: self-valorising value.   
I will start by considering in what way Marx’s value theory can be understood as inherently 
ecological, a question only intermittently developed within critical ecological thought. For this, I will 
go back to what I consider to be the core, yet rarely acknowledged, contribution of Neil Smith’s 
thesis on the “production of nature” to this question: the positing of value as a category of socio-
ecological constitution. Although Smith, against previous Marxian theorisations of nature, correctly 
understood value as an internal and constitutive moment of what we call nature, as Ekers and 
Prudham point out (2017; 2018), much of Smith’s thesis’ pitfalls lie in his relative neglect of the 
crucial theoretical importance of the use-value dimension in Marx’s critique. This is, I will argue, 
what has left Smith’s thesis—and much of the tradition of ecological thought it inaugurated—liable 
to lapse into forms of constructivism that risk ignoring precisely the crucial contradiction at the 
centre of Marx’s theory: that between concrete socio-ecological metabolism and its social form 
(Saito, 2017; Burkett, 2014). As long noted by critical appraisals of the production of nature thesis 
(Castree, 1995; Bakker and Bridge, 2006; Braun, 2008; Malm, 2018a), this metabolism presents an 
irreducible autonomy; an autonomy, I want to argue, that cannot be considered ‘external’ to the 
fetishized social forms of capitalist society—i.e. a natural sphere clearly separate from a social one—
, but rather internally constitutive of the contradictory (and destructive) unfolding of these forms as 
ecological projects.  
It is important to note, however, that most of these reappraisals of the role of use-value 
tend to gravitate around issues of ‘materiality’ and non-human nature’s recalcitrance. I think this 
still leaves far too much of the significance of the category of use-value unexplored. This category 
should not be primarily understood as constituting a simple bio-physical substratum of the social 
form of value, but, perhaps above all, the cultural substratum of meaning in which concrete labour 
and everyday practice is always embedded; a dimension with which the abstract process of 
valorisation must always recon in one way or another for its realisation. In other words, the concrete 
socio-ecological actualisation of capitalism can only manifest itself as an intricate relation between 
the processes of abstraction entailed in the constitution and expansion of economic forms and the 
multiple vernacular human mediations of meaning and practice in which these forms must 
ultimately find their cultural grounds—in other words, it expresses the ultimate inextricability of 
value and use-value. Following the late Mexican-Ecuadorian philosopher Bolívar Echeverría, I 
explore the concept of use-value as signalling the necessary ‘horizons of meaning’ in which the 
valorisation of value and human practice must always be contradictorily rooted—a contradictory 
internal relation that gives rise to the specific cultural forms that mediate socio-ecological 
reproduction under capitalism, and constitute the cultural grounds for the political composition of 
both domination and resistance. This in turn leads to a problematisation of the concept of 
‘production’ itself, when approached from the point of view of use-value. Finally, I will explore the 
possibility of a symbolic-materialist approach to this field of meaning/value drawing from 
anthropological theories of value rooted in Marx’s, in particular the work of Terence Turner and 
David Graeber. Through an understanding of value(s) as a semiotic process of mediation between 
human subjective activity and its sociality, integrated with a revised notion of the production of 
nature, I aim to sketch out a route to a more textured account of the contested (re)production of 
the actually existing landscapes of capitalism, hopefully giving value theory much needed 
ethnographic traction. As Ekers and Loftus (2013) point out, what is needed is linking what remain 
very abstract theoretical categories to a more textured account of the concrete practical, ecological, 
and symbolic density of the landscapes in which capital is reproduced and resisted.  
 
II. Value and Neil Smith’s thesis on “the production of nature” 
For Marx, the category of ‘value’ grasped the core of capitalist modernity in its most essential 
terms—it designated that which made capitalist domination so historically distinct (Postone, 1993). 
In its Marxian reading, ‘value’2 is an historically specific form taken by human material relations of 
interdependence and mutual constitution—“social life-process” (Marx, 1990:173)—one in which 
relations between people constitute themselves in the fetishized and self-expanding form of an 
alien economic objectivity (Bonefeld, 2014). As a theory about a historically specific form taken by 
the social character of the metabolic relation to nature (i.e. labour) (Marx, 1990:174), Marx’s theory 
of value has always been by implication a theory of the specificity of socio-ecological relations under 
capitalism.  
Formulated in this way, the fact that Marx’s theory of value has fundamental ecological 
implications may seem self-evident. And yet these implications have only been intermittently 
explored systematically within the Marxist tradition3. One of the first to explicitly take this direction 
was Neil Smith, through his thesis on the ‘production of nature’ (Smith, [1984] 2008). Smith’s 
contribution was greatly influential, as it inaugurated a distinct branch of Marxist ecological thought, 
one with particular influence within Geography. In the three decades since its original formulation, 
much has been written on the merits and pitfalls of Smith’s thesis. Reviewing this literature in depth 
is beyond the scope of this paper. My purpose in going back to Smith is instead to recover his 
underappreciated, but nonetheless crucial contribution regarding the ecological significance of 
Marx’s value theory, and try to develop this idea in a somewhat different direction, one that can 
avoid some of the crucial weaknesses running through much of this strain of Marxist ecological 
thought. 
Smith considered that the notion of ‘Nature’ as an external domain, fundamentally 
independent and clearly distinguishable from human activity, was an ideological form rooted in the 
particular material experience of the bourgeoisie (2008: 28). This dualist conception of Society and 
Nature renders the latter in principle independent from social relations and labour. ‘Nature’, 
through an historical process of “aggressive externalization” (Smith, 2007: 24), is thus rendered a 
domain defined as object without subject. This is nothing less than the ontological underpinning of 
primitive accumulation—i.e. the material separation of humanity from nature, through which the 
historical conditions for capitalism (the production of a collective subject without object—the 
proletariat) came about. As such, for Smith the ideological notion of ‘Nature’ abstracted the central 
role of labour in what he called ‘the production of nature’. Smith, following Marx (1990:283), argued 
that the labour process is a transformative moment of both its human and non-human elements, 
and that therefore so-called ‘natural conditions’ are not only a premise, but also a product of 
society’s metabolic history. Nature is thus produced. The traditional Marxist equation of nature with 
the realm of use-value is thus for Smith severely misguided. Insofar as the capitalist labour process 
is subsumed under the imperatives of valorisation, value should be conceptualized as an ecological 
force in its own right. In Smith’s own words: 
[I]t is the abstract logic that attaches to the creation and accumulation of social value which 
determines the relation with nature under capitalism. Thus the movement from the abstract 
to the concrete (…) is the perpetual translation actually achieved in the relation with nature 
under capitalism; abstract determinations at the level of value are continually translated into 
concrete social activity in the relation with nature. (Smith, 2008:70, emphasis added.) 
Within capitalism, ‘first nature’—defined by Smith as the concrete effect of the labour process and 
the realm of use-values—is subordinated to the ‘second nature’ of the abstract value relation, under 
the imperative of profit as the ultimate systemic telos. For Smith, due to the “ability of capital to 
produce the material world in its own image (…) the production of first nature from within and as 
part of second nature makes the production of nature, not first or second nature in themselves, the 
dominant reality” (Smith, 2008:83).  
Smith thus posits the category of value as one of socio-ecological constitution: under 
capitalism the material constitution of a growing field of ecological relations is thoroughly implicated 
in the reproduction of value relations—value effectively functions as a constitutive environment-
making force in the capitalist landscape through the real subsumption of the labour process. 
Moreover, it can be further said that the capitalist law of value is premised upon a particular set of 
spatial and environmental relations: i.e. the ongoing enclosure of commons, the separation of 
people from land, and the concomitant creation of the conditions for the private appropriation of 
social labour through the wage relation. Rather than merely having environmental ‘effects’, the 
emergence and persistence of the capitalist law of value is contingent on the ongoing reproduction 
of a particular sort of landscape (cf. Moore, 2015). 
 
III. Abstraction, materiality, and meaning: on the limits of Smith’s thesis  
Smith stressed the difference between his conception of production of nature and that of the 
‘domination of nature’ emergent from the Frankfurt School (e.g. Schmidt, [1971] 2014), by signalling 
the “ways in which social production can create accidental, unintended and even counter-effective 
results vis-à-vis nature”: instead, his thesis “makes no pretence to the control of nature” (Smith, 
2007: 24). Yet, the theoretical basis provided by Smith allows for no way of understanding these 
unruly, yet conspicuous, moments of capitalist ecologies other than as the spasmodic consequence, 
however unintended, of a logic of valorisation constituted as the central organising principle in 
nature itself (Smith, 2008:91). This is something Smith’s critics picked up early on. For example, 
Bakker and Bridge (2006), foregrounding the recalcitrance often entailed in non-human nature’s 
materiality, emphasised how the production of nature thesis “struggled with how to represent the 
active capacities of biophysical processes dialectically without invoking an external nature”, and that 
“by envisioning first nature transformed via labour, ends up squeezing out any productive or 
generative role for ecological or biophysical processes” (2006:9; see also Castree 1995, Ekers and 
Prudham 2017; 2018; and Malm 2018). In a similar vein, Braun (2008) argued that although much 
of the work carried on in the wake of Smith’s thesis did make an effort to reincorporate non-human 
nature’s inherent resistances, it largely failed to do so without ultimately representing this as 
‘external’ to a pre-constituted ontological field of economic forces; a structure of accumulation 
upon which non-human nature exerted its resistances and imposed its terms ‘from the outside’ 
(2008:668-669).  
 Similar problems have been pointed out regarding how Smith’s thesis relates to the 
complexities and differentiation of concrete human labour. In their reassessment of Smith’s thesis 
and the work done in this tradition, Ekers and Loftus (2013) identify “a hiatus between concrete 
studies that focus on the differentiation of labour, and work that concentrates on the capital-labour 
relation in the abstract (as socially necessary labour-time)” (2013:243), and, turning to Gramsci’s 
‘historicizing impulse’, call for a firmer grounding of theorisation in the concrete and multiple 
determinations of human practice. Eaton (2011) for her part, draws attention to how agrarian 
production at once illustrates the force of the production of nature as framework, but also highlights 
its shortcomings, especially in relation to the multiple mediations organising concrete labour in 
family farms; and to how the production of nature has to be also approached as the production of 
meaning, an issue that, although acknowledged by Smith (2008:107), was not developed to the 
extent the central role of place in the differentiation of nature would demand.  
 Underlying these critiques and openings is in my view the question of how to adequately 
understand the relation between economic forms—the “abstract logic” of which Smith considers 
drives the production of nature “all the way down”—and their concretion in socio-ecological 
reproduction. Pace Smith, and as these critiques point out, the ecologies produced by the uneven 
process of subsumption of the latter under the former cannot be adequately reduced to the abstract 
determinations of valorisation, but instead constitute intricate and fraught entanglements of 
internally related moments of abstraction, meaning, and materiality—of value and use-value. There 
is a crucially important dialectical relation of non-identity at play here; one that gets lost in Smith’s 
attempt at transcending the distinction between first and second nature (Smith 2008:83). This move 
quickly seems to lead Smith into muddling the crucial distinction between form and content—two 
internally related terms of a contradiction underpinning the dialectical movement at the core of 
Marx’s theory of value (see Burkett 2014, Saito 2017). What Marx’s value theory allows us to do, I 
wish to argue, is to conceptualize the irreducibility that defines any realist conception of nature as 
an internal determination of the contradictory historical socio-ecological development of the value-
form. And, in particular, the fraught convergence, in the co-production of nature, of the production 
of value with the production of meaning; an issue to which I will return further below. 
 
IV. Non-identity and socio-ecological contradictions  
In this sense, much of the critiques around Smith’s thesis can be traced back to importance 
of the ways in which nature, both human and extra-human, stand in non-identical (yet not external) 
relation to its capitalist social forms. The importance of this relation cannot be overstated. As Malm 
(2018b) suggests, part of the enduring aesthetic allure of our inherited conceptions of ‘nature’ is 
that they still hold the capacity to evoke this constitutive irreducibility of life to the juggernaut of 
capitalist accumulation—in the words of Adorno, quoted in Malm, “natural beauty remains the 
allegory of this beyond” (2018b:28). Indeed, this relation of non-identity between form and content 
can be understood as the fundamental point of departure for critical thought, or more precisely, 
thought that is concerned with crisis. John Holloway formulates this as thinking “the world from our 
misfitting” (Holloway, 2010:9), from the ways in which our social life-process is not only constituted 
through the reified forms of capital, but against and beyond them: a ubiquitous misfitting that gives 
capitalist society (and ecologies) its immanent self-antagonistic and crisis-prone movement. In this 
sense, departing from the non-identity of form and content implies understanding capitalism not 
from domination, but “from the perspective of its crisis, its contradictions, its weaknesses…” 
(Holloway, 2010:9). From this starting point, “the only way in which we can understand the capitalist 
forms of social relations (and, at their centre, abstract labour) is as forms swollen with their own 
negation, forms that do not contain their content, but from which their content constantly 
overflows” (Holloway, 2010:188).  
One should, however, be careful not to reintroduce here the division between nature and 
society rightly criticised by Smith, as this distinction is not coterminous with that between social 
form and material-practical content. On the contrary: these dialectics of non-identity implicates 
nature in both its human and extra-human moments—whether it is, to borrow Malm’s line, a 
parrot’s “exuberant indifference to the value-form” (Malm 2018b:28), or a worker’s antipathy 
towards its compulsions. The ways in which human and non-human natures articulate and feed back 
into each other in the reproduction of these dialectics of non-identity remains in this sense a 
fundamental field of militant inquiry.   
Perhaps this important point can be illustrated by turning to some long-standing questions 
related to value theory in agrarian studies. As mentioned earlier, this dialectic between the material 
life-process and its economic form-determinations underpins Marx’s theory of value, and it can be 
seen to resurface strongly in his theory of differential rent (Marx, 1991). Ecological variability—e.g. 
different qualities of the soil, climate, etc.—runs necessarily counter to the homogenizing 
tendencies of the law of value—e.g. the equalisation of profit rates—as goods rendered equivalent 
in the market incorporate differential costs rooted in the inherently diverse ecological conditions in 
which agricultural production is embedded. When demand is such that harvests produced under 
less productive lands need be incorporated, these ‘distort’ the regulating market price, which then 
generates permanent ‘surplus profits’ or a differential rent for those producing on the best lands. 
Needless to say, this immanent resistance of nature to the homogenizing compulsion of capitalist 
markets has had a determinant importance for the historical development of agrarian social 
formations under capitalism. For instance, Mexican agrarian scholar Armando Bartra (2006) argued 
that for a long time differential rent constituted the structural basis for the persistence of the 
peasantry in peripheral capitalist countries (Latin America in particular) as states attempted to 
muffle this rent through the reliance for cheap food on a class of producers whose ties to the land—
associated both to cultural and subsistence conditions—made them able to sustain production 
below the average rate of profit, often at the point of simple reproduction. In other words, for 
Bartra, the resistance that ecological variability necessarily poses to the operation of the law of value 
was one of the main conditions for the reproduction of socio-economically, culturally, and agro-
ecologically intricate relations to the land in the Latin American countryside during the better part 
of the twentieth century.  
To be sure, this strategy for securing cheap food (and lowering wages) at a national level 
went largely out the window in the neoliberal period, as production for national consumption was 
replaced by cheap food imports, and the lion’s share of state subsidies went towards export-
oriented capital-intensive production (Rubio, 2001). Nonetheless, the underlying contradictions 
have appeared in even more explosive forms as millions of people moved from being part of a 
structurally exploited class of agricultural producers to becoming a marginalized rural population—
large segments of which have endured a generation-long simple reproduction ‘squeeze’ (Bernstein, 
2001)—whose ways of life, and with it the historical and symbolic density of the land, often appear 
hopelessly anachronistic from the perspective of a globally rearticulated law of value (Rubio, 2001). 
These shifting tides in the international division of labour recasts a reconfigured, and particularly 
brutal, geography of rent in the form of, inter alia, intensified and expanded circuits of extraction 
(Arboleda, 2019), which have become a characteristic feature of Latin American rural landscapes 
and its political struggles, in neoliberal and ‘postneoliberal’ countries alike (Svampa, 2013; Gudynas, 
2012; Webber, 2017). This renewed geography of rent, across its different periods, has provided the 
backdrop for the development of some of the most important popular movements in Latin America, 
such as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), or the Brazilian Landless Peasant 
Movement (MST), among many other indigenous movements, all of which have made world-
historical ripples in the geographies of anticapitalist struggle (Rubio, 2001; Bernstein, 2001), and are 
inextricably linked to the material reproduction of a wealth of agro-biodiversity and traditional agro-
ecosystems (Boege, 2008), the multiple values of which find little or no representation under the 
tempest unleashed by global market forces on agrarian social formations for over a generation. 
And even in this context, capitalism’s struggle with its natural foundations continues to 
impose in many places the reproduction of a relative exteriority within the agrarian landscapes of 
capitalism itself: that is, the reproduction, even if fragmented and pauperized, of diversity in both 
social and agroecological terms, in the shadows of the decrees of the world market. As Bartra 
(2006:25) notes, capitalist fantasies of a completely subsumed nature notwithstanding, the 
irreducible autonomy of the latter makes itself felt in the rhythms it imposes on agricultural 
production (cf. Mann and Dickinson, 1978), which seasonally concentrates the demand for labour 
on sowing and harvest periods. Seasonal labourers must however eat year-round, and thus peasant 
production and its associated moral economies continue to be reproduced as a constitutive feature 
of the landscape. To quote Bartra: 
[I]n the end, what allows the specialized agribusiness entrepreneur to pay only for the 
workdays required is a diversification of crops that runs on the account of the employee and 
her family. This is illustrated by the capitalist plantations in the coastal valleys [in Mexico], 
which are only economically viable thanks to the peasant milpas4 in the mountains. This is to 
say, that, finally, productive diversification enters through the backdoor, associated in this case 
to the combination of two different immanent economic rationalities. (2006:25, my 
translation). 
Returning to the idea of the production of nature and the way it understands value as a socio-
ecological pivot, the preceding discussion suggests at least two points. On the one hand, Smith 
original critique of the nature/society binary risked losing sight of the dialectics of non-identity 
between internally related moments of social form and socio-metabolic content. On the other, this 
dialectic is fundamental to understand not only ecological contradictions, but also important 
aspects of social movements, and perhaps more crucially, the ways in which these two aspects 
relate internally to each other.  
 
V. The ‘vernacular’ and world-ecological totalization 
The above mentioned idea that capitalism, as a regime of value, and its particular accumulation 
strategies and shifting divisions of labour imply the reproduction of a relative exteriority—a field of 
non-commodified practices which although not directly constitutive of value, constitute 
nonetheless its conditions of possibility—has a long history within the Marxist tradition, stretching 
perhaps back to Rosa Luxemburg’s ([1913], 2003) account of imperialism, through debates around 
the persistence of ‘peasant’ production within capitalism (Bernstein et al., 2018; Bartra, 2006; Ploeg, 
2013; Bernstein, 2010), to the pathbreaking contemporary developments in the field of social 
reproduction theory (e.g. Arruzza, 2015; Bhattacharya, 2017). The theoretical and political force of 
this idea perhaps lies in the way it allows for an understanding of the internal and mutually 
constitutive nature of the relations between capitalism’s impersonal mechanisms of domination and 
exploitation—i.e. class-divided social practice expressed in the compulsive dynamism of economic 
forms—with patriarchy, colonialism/racialisation, and ecological despoliation. One of the 
pioneering works in this sense was that of Maria Mies ([1986] 2014), who outlined the connections 
between the historical consolidation of the capitalist system, the emergence of a new relation to 
nature, the control over women’s bodies through witch hunts, and colonial expansion and slavery. 
In her words, for the capitalist system to take root it was necessary for ‘women, nature, and 
colonies’ to be “externalized, declared to be outside civilized society, pushed down, and thus made 
invisible, as the under-water part of an iceberg is invisible, yet constitute the base of the whole” 
(Mies 2014:77). In this sense, the reproduction of capital’s value regime can be seen to always entail 
the simultaneous reproduction of its ontological flip-side: a regime of non-value sustained through 
the reproduction of a complex web of forms of oppression. 
More recently, this idea has been taken up and developed in a systematic fashion by Jason 
W. Moore (e.g. , 2015; 2017a), whose deeply original historical and theoretical work has had a very 
important impact in recent discussions within ecological Marxism, and ecological thought more 
generally. Developing a non-dualist world-systems perspective—i.e. ‘world-ecological’—, the model 
proposed by Moore hinges on a dialectic of exploitation and appropriation inherent to capital’s law 
of value. The establishment of socially necessary labour time as measure of value implies what 
Moore calls the historical production of an ‘abstract social nature’: the cultural and political 
mechanisms of legibility (Scott, 1998) and control that capitalist power imposes on the socio-
ecological matrix through which capital accumulation takes place. For Moore, world-historical cycles 
of accumulation depend upon the production of an ‘ecological surplus’ through revolutions in the 
ability to appropriate unpaid human (e.g. unpaid domestic labour) and extra-human (e.g. soil, old-
growth forests, etc.) work: the law of value is the law of ‘Cheap Nature’, i.e. the aggressive 
externalisation, devaluation, and appropriation of the ‘web of life’. 
Moore’s account of capital’s world-ecological logic is undoubtedly generative and 
illuminating. Nevertheless, from the perspective I am developing here the model remains one-sided: 
the terms of its account of the concrete and contradictory movement of socio-ecologies remain 
those of capitalist domination—i.e. the law of ‘cheap nature’ as capital’s form of world-ecological 
totalization. If, as I have argued, we consider socio-ecological reproduction and its capitalist forms—
which, as Moore explains, encompass both an economic and a cultural moment; abstract labour and 
‘abstract social nature’, respectively (Moore, 2017b)—to be characterised by a dialectical 
movement of non-identity, then the critical question would be that of how the negation—the law 
of value/cheap nature—is itself negated in the concrete life-process, in and against its alienated 
world-ecological totalization in capital. After all, from the point of view of those whose lives are 
‘cheapened’ by capital, life is not actually cheap, but dear—and it is this fact that ultimately compels 
socio-ecological reproduction onwards. The dialectic described by Moore is that of the internal 
relations between capitalist forms of domination—sphere of capitalization and sphere of 
appropriation—but not that of the non-identity between both of these real abstractions and the 
concrete life-processes that are constituted through them. This is what I think has left Moore’s 
model, despite his intentions, open to be read as a ‘hyper-constructivist’ position (e.g. Foster, 2016), 
in a manner similar to Smith’s, as it confines its account of socioecological reproduction to the form 
it assumes from the standpoint of capital’s world-ecological totalisation: the value-form and its 
cheap nature pedestal.  
A seldom recognized distinction made by Ivan Illich might help to clarify this point. Illich 
(1980) distinguished between what he termed ‘shadow work’—those unpaid forms of activity that 
only exist as the necessary complement of commodity production, and that are inextricable from 
it—and what he called ‘the vernacular’. In its classical Latin usage, the word denoted “sustenance 
derived from reciprocity patterns embedded in every aspect of life, as distinguished from 
sustenance that comes from exchange or from vertical distribution” (Illich, 1980:85); a meaning that 
was later applied to language to signal the non-formal rootedness of the latter in the speaker's own 
relational grounds and everyday usage, as opposed to its formal abstraction and codification as part 
of the constitution of state power. For Illich, the word allows for greater precision and depth than 
that afforded by terms such as ‘subsistence’, which too often is taken as ‘bare minimum material 
conditions for life’ and reinforces economistic understandings of social practice. In contrast, the 
‘vernacular’ encompasses a crucial dimension of human existence and practice—present in 
practices and forms of knowledge as diverse as music, childbirth, architecture, notions of 
reasonableness, preparation of food, the shaping of language and other forms of embodied 
competence, etc.—that is oriented to an embodied and contextually defined purpose, or telos. Illich 
was emphatic about the importance of the distinction that this word allowed within what is normally 
understood as ‘social reproduction’. For Illich the fundamental opposition posed by modern society 
was not that between wage labour and its complementary ‘shadow work’, but between this 
binary—the dual form of capitalist domination—and the vernacular, everyday embodied relations 
of mutual constitution, which although fragmentary and arguably receding, constitute a “mode of 
being, doing, and making” irreducible to abstract formalization and quantification, one productive 
of its own immanent teloi.  
Illich’s notion of the vernacular nevertheless encounters its limits in the extent to which it 
posits this realm of human practice as ‘external’ to capitalist modernity and its historical 
development. Instead, here I want to push Illich’s notion further: the ‘vernacular’ does not 
necessarily designate different kinds of practice—i.e. modes of being external to capitalist 
modernity—, but more fundamentally, different dimensions of practice within capitalist society. 
Operating within Marx’s dialectic of the concrete and abstract dimensions of capitalist labour, the 
vernacular, embodied orientation towards a contextually defined telos should be seen as internal 
to every form of labour, even if it appears only in its negated form—inter alia, as class struggle (cf. 
Cleaver, 1992). 
More specifically, and for example, under capitalist relations of production the labour 
process is a site where contradicting teloi co-exist: while from the standpoint of capital this process 
is ultimately faced from the abstract imperative of profitability, for its constitutive powers—i.e. 
workers—the same process is ultimately faced from the rather more grounded imperatives and 
values that arise from reproduction and enhancement of their life-worlds. In the constitutive 
metabolic moments of capital’s valorisation, the material acts involved thus appear as sites of 
conflicting valuations—something well illustrated in Marx’s detailed examination of the struggles 
around the definition of the working day (Marx, 1990). Regardless of the imposition of abstract 
determinations, or rather precisely because of them, at the level of concrete practice, the labour 
process is beset by innumerable acts that from the point of view of capital’s valorisation constitute 
instances of ‘indiscipline’ or resistance which cannot be ignored when approaching the material 
constitution of the landscape, nor the particular forms taken by accumulation strategies, or the 
reified concepts of movement of capital itself (above all, profitability). This does not mean that these 
acts are necessarily consciously articulated as ‘resistance’, rather, they appear as such from the point 
of view of the accumulation process and its imperatives of abstraction, legibility, fetishization, and 
expansion. 
As a thoroughly internal moment of capitalist society, the ‘vernacular’ should not be 
understood as an ahistorical category; on the contrary, it is an immanent critical one—a  concept 
internal to capital as a totalising movement of abstraction—rooted in the contradiction between 
the socio-ecological reproduction and its social form; a contradiction that can be seen condensed in 
Marx’s analysis of the structure of the commodity as fractured by its existence as value and use-
value. And as the basis for use-value, the concrete historical instantiations of the vernacular 
dimensions of life are inextricable from the historical development of the social form of capital: 
capitalism produces its own forms of vernacular practices, values, and consciousness. Moreover, 
although there are of course properties that are specific to human practice (which will concern the 
rest of this paper), at the most general level of abstraction ‘the vernacular’ can be seen to implicate 
the practically infinite layers of autopoietic activity that make up the biosphere, which cannot but 
persevere, at the most basic level, in their autonomy. 
If, as Moore holds, following Federici, “it is precisely the symbolic erasure, the 
invisibilization, of care work that has been the necessary condition of capitalist development” 
(Moore, 2017c:330), the question becomes how do we think against this invisibilisation, how do we 
think from that which is being invisibilised? Think for example of a river: as abstract social nature it 
might appear as ‘energy’, as cartography, as quantifiable magnitudes of various kinds; as value it 
might appear in the form of the potential rents generated by the establishment of a hydropower 
project. But what is being negated in these specific forms? The river as a life-process, co-produced 
by the symbolic and historical density of its human relations, and the infinite complexity of the non-
human layers of activity that make up its ecology. If the task of articulating a revolutionary politics 
for a different conception of the values mediating our mutual constitution is not to fall into idealist 
utopianism, we must attend to their immanent grounds in our actually existing life-process: in the 
ways in which socio-ecological reproduction is necessarily compelled onward, in spite of everything, 
through the relentless vernacular reproduction of meaning, purpose, and value(s). This is a process, 
to be sure, fragmented, incoherent, and contradictory. But at the same time it constitutes the only 
possible cultural-practical basis for the political composition of the necessary negation of the 
‘cheapening’ of life that sustains the ongoing cataclysm of world-ecological totalization under 
capital’s value regime. In rooting our politics and our critique in the relations that constitute the 
vernacular sites of non-identity, we might find the grounds for the oppositional reenchantement of 
nature that Neil Smith, writing over a decade after his original thesis, thought to be a still unfulfilled 
task for the left (Smith, 1998). And it is here where the recovery of the theoretical importance of 
the category of use-value—which Bolívar Echeverría considered to be the “implicit conception that 
sustains the entire edifice of the critique of political economy” (2014:24)—becomes clear.  
 
VI. Production and the perspective of use-value: on Echeverría’s critical theory and 
anthropological theories of value 
In these final sections I want to turn to a combined reading of the work of Echeverría, and 
anthropological theories of value—in particular as developed in the work of Terence Turner and 
subsequently by David Graeber—, in order to move beyond a flat physicalist and/or utilitarian 
conception of use-value, and towards a better account of the concrete actualization of capitalism 
as a contradictory articulation of abstraction and meaning. 
Echeverría’s Marxism treaded paths notably divergent from the mainstream of Latin 
American Marxism of his day (1980s and 90s); which, often pray to the combined pressures of 
ossified dogmatisms and rising postmodern intellectual hegemony, was at the time characterised 
by its receding influence and marked by political defeat. Echeverría, in part motivated by what he 
perceived as the failings of the orthodox Marxist tradition, developed a non-economistic 
understanding of the value-theoretical aspects of Marxian critique to make sense of the specificities 
of capitalist modernity in the history of Latin America; an endeavour through which he developed a 
distinctly non-Eurocentric reading of Marx, and of modernity itself. On the basis of a critical 
reconstruction of the category of use-value—the subsumption of which he considered to be the 
foundational contradiction of capitalist modernity, and the core of Marx’s critique (see Echeverría, 
2014)—, Echeverría gave deeply original accounts of issues like cultural form, peripheral modernity, 
and mestizaje, among many others (see Barreda, 2011; Sáenz De Sicilia and Brito Rojas, 2014).  
It is important to distinguish here the sort of materialism that underpins Echeverría’s—and 
to a great extent, as I will explain below, Turner’s—reading of Marx, and his reconstruction of the 
category of use-value. This is a materialism which has little to do with ‘matter’ itself (Toscano, 2014). 
Rather, it is one that departs from Marx’s reflexions in his Theses on Feuerbach (Marx, 2002; see 
Echeverría, 2011: 437-469), of how the ‘contemplative’/externalised representation of a material 
word stripped from an active subject of traditional materialism is but the inverted expression of the 
idealist conception of active subjectivity in abstraction from the practical world. This was an impasse 
that Marx sought to escape through grounding his materialism on “revolutionary, practical-critical 
activity”—the subjective, transformative practical engagement with the world. For Marx, however, 
the differentia specifica of human practical activity is precisely the fact that its concrete forms are 
not given by an ahistorical nature (Marx, 2005), thus positing, for a critical materialism, the problem 
of “the history of the forms or socio-political modes within which the human life-process takes 
place; it must be configured as historical materialism” (Echeverría 2011:442, my translation; c.f. 
Murray, 2016). 
This conception of materialism is what underpins Echeverría rejection of the common 
reductive reading of use-value as the mere physical content of the social form of value. What makes 
the ‘needs’ satisfied by use-value specifically human is that they are irreducible to some unmediated 
instance of ‘natural’ requirements, but only exist through a movement of transnaturalisation 
(Echeverría, 2014) into specific cultural forms. The notion of ‘use’, in short, is necessarily defined in 
relation to a particular telos; it is implicated in social and moral universes in relation to which both 
subjective activity and practical objects acquire meaning (ibid.; cf. Sahlins, 2013). For Marx’s 
purposes of building a critique of political economy, the point of the concept of use-value is the 
identification of a dialectical tension within structure of the commodity form: it distinguishes 
between the needs defined by the expansive accumulation process and the needs of concrete 
human subjects, aspects which under capitalist social relations develop as contradiction. Use-value 
thus fundamentally functions as a category of contrast, one whose dialectical relation to value as a 
measure of socially necessary labour time makes way for Marx’s critique of political economy. 
However, as Echeverría pointed out (2014), although crucial, use-value is a category left 
comparatively undeveloped within Marx’s work.  
To move in this direction, I think it is necessary to interrogate the notion of ‘production’ from 
the point of view of use-value. Here, as I will explain below, the concerns of Echeverría and those of 
Turner and Graeber overlap in significant ways. Echeverría reminds us that to “produce is to 
objectify, to inscribe in the form of the product a transformative intention addressed to the subject 
itself” (2014:29). In this sense, from the point of view of use-value, the social production of 
objectivity is a subordinate aspect within a process ultimately oriented towards the production of a 
particular form of (social) subject (cf. Graeber, 2007: 95). And for Echeverría, it is the capacity of the 
social subject to give form to its constitutive relations of interdependence that defines its 
subjecthood [sujetidad], a movement through which “its identity and the differential identity of its 
members” is constituted (Echeverría, 2014:27), and through which a structural social telos is 
founded. Production, from the point of view of use-value, can only ultimately be the symbolic-
material production of particular kinds of persons, and, more precisely, the horizons of meaning in 
which the values that orient their life-activity are reproduced, or contested (c.f. Graeber 2001, 
2007).  
Arguing in a similar direction, anthropologist David Graeber (2007:94) calls attention to 
Marx’s comments in his ethnographic notebooks, where he points out that 
Among the ancients, we discover no single enquiry as to which form of landed property … 
creates maximum wealth. Wealth does not appear as the aim of production … The enquiry is 
always about what kind of property creates the best citizens. …  
Thus the ancient conception, in which man always appears (in however narrowly national, 
religious, or political a definition) as the aim of production, seems very much more exalted than 
the modern world, in which production is the aim of man and wealth the aim of production. 
(Marx, 1965:84)  
Marx here notes the particularity of capitalist modernity, the barbaric inversion inflicted by 
capitalistically constituted production onto the social life-process: that “in which production is the 
aim of man [sic] and wealth the aim of production”. The objective dimension of the social life-
process—which consolidates as the discrete sphere we know today, i.e. the economy, with the 
generalization of the commodity-form as social nexus, and its autonomisation as capital—
constitutes itself as an ‘automatic subject’, in relation to which the social life-process becomes 
structurally devalued as a mere means, caught in the unending treadmill of valorisation (Postone, 
1993). In this context, from the perspective of Echeverría use-value appears as an immanent critical 
concept, one which “shatters” this horizon of modern thought (Echeverría, 2014:24), and allows for 
the articulation of a critical discourse. This critique sheds light on the way the concrete organization 
of social reproduction under capitalist modernity is torn by the perennial struggle of the ‘spectral’ 
inversion of the value-form to subsume the ‘socio-natural form’5 of social reproduction signalled by 
the concept of use-value (Echeverría, 2011:283). The central political struggle posited by capitalist 
modernity is, for Echeverría, one over the form-determination of social reproduction (Sáenz De Sicilia 
& Brito Rojas, 2014).   
As mentioned earlier, the problematisation of ‘production’ entailed in Echeverría’s analysis of 
use-value resonates in interesting and in my view quite productive ways with a different stream of 
scholarship within anthropology which has developed a Marxian approach to the question of value 
(see Graeber, 2001). The ethnographic focus of this latter body of work develops a very similar 
conception of social form and production at more concrete levels. The pioneering author here is the 
late Terence Turner, who in his work with the Kayapo in central Brazil took the comparative analysis 
of production in a quite different direction from that developed by other streams of Marxian 
anthropology (e.g. Godelier, 1977). These, despite their often sophisticated development of the 
base/superstructure metaphor and ‘the economic’ as determinant instance, generally tended to 
assume the universal validity of the latter category, which remained central to the definition of what 
‘production’ is about (Kahn and Llobera, 1980). Turner, instead, departed from the kind of 
materialism implied in Marx’s form analysis, as explained above. For him, Marx’s value theory 
provided an immensely powerful form of materialist symbolic analysis. Turner argued that “the 
definition of what counts as ‘production’ in any society is ethnographically inseparable from how it 
defines the need (or needs) that serve as the focus (or foci) of its productive activities” (Turner, 
2008: 45). In capitalism, the alienated productive actions of social subjects are systematically pinned 
against each other in the form of market competition of individual capitals, which in turn produces 
the systemic compulsion for the ever-expanding valorisation. This ultimate systemic need 
… is on a different level from the more mundane needs for material subsistence and services 
satisfied by the commodities produced by capitalist firms. Rather, it is the structural necessity 
whose satisfaction constitutes the aim of all the productive activities comprising the capitalist 
system as a whole. It thus (an important point here for anthropological purposes) reflexively 
becomes the criterion for defining which activities count as ‘productive’ and therefore as 
creating value in a capitalist economy. (Turner, 2008:45, my emphasis.) 
Turner here is historicizing what is deemed to be the object of production in relation to which what 
is considered to be productive activity is defined in any given system of social action6. In the case of 
the Kayapo, Turner argues,  
… social production, in the absence of markets and production of commodities for exchange 
(ie, of ‘economies’), is concerned above all with the production of social persons and relations, 
and the social values attaching to them. The production of subsistence goods and services, 
while important, appears as an ancillary aspect of the process of (re-)producing social persons 
and the families and extended family relations that serve as the organizing framework of this 
process, rather than a distinct, separately institutionalized domain of production and exchange: 
that is, not as an ‘economy’. (Turner, 2003:11)  
Following Marx’s insights, for Turner the ‘values’ that reflexively define what sorts of activities are 
considered to be ‘productive’ in any given society constitute the symbolic mediations through which 
individual actions are oriented, and meaningfully integrated into an interdependent totality of 
practices. Value is the way in which individual actions acquire social meaning (Graeber, 2001). 
Turner shows the main categories of social value among the Kayapo to be “beauty” and “power”; 
aspects of the identity of persons that are produced by the Kayapo system of social production, 
realised by particular persons in particular ritual settings, and to which its own mechanisms of 
exploitation are articulated (Turner, 1984; 2003; 2004). Value(s) in this sense delineate and 
structure social worlds which are understood “not just as a collection of persons and things but 
rather as a project of mutual creation, as something collectively made and remade” (Graeber, 
2013:222). Turner’s conception of value (linked to his anti-economistic materialist conception of 
production) in this sense functions in a manner analogous to that which Echeverría called ‘social 
telos’: it gives a definite form to society’s relations of interdependence, and in turn constitutes the 
symbolic mediations through which individual actions acquire their social meaning and orientation. 
From this point of view, as David Graeber—a former student of Turner who took up the latter’s 
largely unpublished project—points out, ’cultures’ and ‘societies’ appear as projects for the pursuit 
of a particular form of value (or, more commonly, a constellation of these); projects that by 
definition imply collective conceptions of both the meaning of human existence, and the nature of 
the world; i.e. cosmologies (Graeber, 2013).  
These ideas open up new dimensions to Smith’s thesis on the ‘production of nature’, and in my 
view lay the basis for a common materialist understanding of cultural and economic registers of the 
concept of ‘value’. In the words of Echeverría (2014:27): “the confrontation of the subject with 
nature... [is] an indirect confrontation, mediated by the confrontation of the subject with its own 
sociability.” Value is, in the sense developed by Turner, not only generative of cosmologies and 
conceptions of the world, but constituted by and generative of particular forms of social praxis, 
structuring the way metabolic relations are socio-symbolically mediated, and therefore, following 
Smith’s argument, a pivotal moment in both the material and symbolic constitution of particular 
historical ecologies.  
 
VII. Value, struggle and the production of nature.  
One of the relevant implications of Turner’s approach is that value as an economic form, and 
‘values’ as moral-cultural “conceptions of the desirable” are to be understood as different 
refractions of a common process through which human practical action is confronted with and 
integrated into its own social universe of meaning (Graeber, 2001:78). It is worth unpacking this 
relation a bit further. What I think Turner’s approach casts into relief are some of the key 
implications of Marx’s account of social form, and what one could call the basic elements of his 
semiotic-materialist approach (cf. Saenz De Sicilia and Rojas, 2018). In Marx’s value theory, the 
capitalist form-determination of social reproduction can be described in the following terms: as 
primitive accumulation fragments socio-ecological relations and establishes the private and 
alienated character of capitalist labour, the irreducibly social character of human practice comes to 
exist in the form of ‘abstract labour’/value, and is expressed through a symbolic attribute of the 
commodity—its exchange-value. This attribute can in turn only be realised and defined in relation 
to a social totality, ultimately constituted by the world market. In Marx’s account of value one can 
discern three internally related aspects of social reproduction that are organised in the historical 
form of ‘value’: meaning (as value), practice (as labour), and sociality (as market). In other words, 
Marx’s theory of value as a broader theory of social form implies positing 1. the social and symbolic 
nature of human practice, 2. the practical and social nature of symbolic meaning, and 3. the symbolic 
and practical nature of social relations. The conception of social reproduction entailed by Marx’s 
materialist analysis is therefore one in which human subjective practice is inextricably linked to a 
socially defined telos/purpose/meaning/value, which is in turn reproduced through the integration 
of subjective practice into a particular social/relational field, which is consequently constituted and 
defined by a set of meaningfully concatenated practices.  
The realm of use-value, in this sense, can be seen as the variegated vernacular substratum 
of practice, sociality and meaning in which socio-ecological reproduction—including that which is 
capitalistically organised—must always be rooted: value, as pure abstraction, can only find its 
ultimate social validation in so far as it can anchor itself in the field of use-value. All economies must 
ultimately be in some sense ‘moral economies’. In this sense, what Turner’s and Graeber’s work 
suggests is that Marx’s value theory might provide the elements for a more general symbolic-
materialist theory of social form and of production, one that might recover the largely neglected 
field of use-value from the flat utilitarianism it has been often confined to, and towards an 
understanding of it as field of social relations and practices in which the meanings, purposes and 
identities driving socio-ecological reproduction are reproduced and contested.  
As Graeber highlights, from Turner’s project there emerges a conception of politics in which 
“[t]he ultimate stakes … is not the struggle to appropriate value; it is the struggle to establish what 
value is” (Graeber, 2001:88); i.e. the determination of the meaning(s) of our lives, as active, practical 
processes. For Graeber, values necessarily delineate and instantiate the imaginary totalities in which 
they are realised, albeit to a necessarily partial and fragmentary extent. These are social fields that 
constantly overlap: “[i]n any real social situation, there are likely to be any number of such imaginary 
totalities at play, organized around different conceptions of value” (Graeber, 2001:88), conceptions 
from which particular worldviews emerge and claims about reality are made. Much of daily life, 
from this point of view, consists in the struggle, articulation, or otherwise knitting together of these 
different fields (cf. De Angelis, 2007). In the face of this view of society as a “thousand totalities”, as 
Graeber puts it, it is however necessary to remain aware of the importance of the dialectics signalled 
by the antagonism of value and use-value central to Marx’s critique of capitalist society. For Graeber, 
contra conceptions of our age as one characterised by the contingency, multiplicity, and 
proliferation of values, our current situation should be understood as above all “one in which the 
most gigantic, totalizing, and all-encompassingly universal system of evaluation known to human 
history came to be imposed on almost everything” (Graeber, 2001:89). In this sense, the expansive 
movement of subsumption that characterises capitalism imposes upon multiplicity the dialectics of 
antagonism and non-identity signalled by Marx’s categories of value and use-value. Dialectics, 
rather than effacing multiplicity, is the awareness of the antagonism created by a totalising value 
system, and thus the negative character through which this multiplicity exists as a consequence of 
its subsumption (Holloway et al., 2009). The assertion of difference and multiplicity is not something 
that can be done theoretically—perhaps one of the characteristic ideological moves of liberalism—
, it must be resolved in (anticapitalist) practice. 
Here is where it is necessary to return to Echeverría. In his reading, from the point of view of 
Marx’s critique, capitalist modernity is 
ruled simultaneously by two structuring principles which are inherent to it; two coherences or 
rationalities in contradiction to each other: that of the mode or the ‘natural form’ of life and its 
world and that of the mode or the ‘value form’ … of the same. They are, in addition, two ‘logics’ 
in which the second, that of ‘value’, is permanently in process of dominating over the first, the 
‘natural’, of ‘subsuming’ it.   (Echeverría, 2011:281, my translation) 
For Echeverría, although permanently asserting its dominance, the process of abstract valorisation 
remains necessarily parasitic: as a purely abstract, ‘spectral’ inversion it cannot posit its own 
qualitative content, it is dependent for its anchors of meaning on the use-value dimension of the 
social reproduction—what from Graeber’s point of view is the field of ‘values’. The concrete 
actualization of the capitalist organisation of socio-ecological reproduction thus remains torn 
between these two dimensions: an intricate and fraught articulation of abstraction and meaning, of 
value and use-value, in which capitalist cultural forms—its specific iterations of domination, 
resistance, and adaptation—emerge. The crucial task facing an inquiry into the political ecology of 
capitalist development is to understand this conflictual articulation, the torn existence of capitalism 
as a world-ecological project.   
 
Conclusion  
My intention in this paper was to contribute to current discussions on value theory and nature 
within geography by bringing together previously disconnected strands of literature, and developing 
what I think are the underexplored, but in my view very significant, openings that this combined 
reading offers.  
In the first place, Marx’s value theory—being a theory about the social form of our practical 
engagement with extra-human world and each other—allows us to understand value as a material 
force actively shaping socio-ecological relations on this planet. Foregrounding this was the early, 
and crucial, contribution of the production of nature thesis to this question. Nevertheless, the 
contradictions that characterise the concretion of the abstract logic of valorisation have been 
insufficiently understood, often generating the apparent hiatus between our understanding of the 
abstract and concrete dimensions of capitalist socio-ecologies (Ekers and Loftus 2013), sometimes 
reducing one to the other, and/or running the risk of blunting the edge of value theory for an 
historically and geographically grounded analysis.  
Following Echeverría, I have argued that the category of use-value is the point of departure 
of Marx’s value theory as critique. Often interpreted in flat utilitarian or physicalist terms, the 
category should instead be understood as signalling the necessary horizons of meaning in which 
human practical actions and relations, as well as practical objects, are embedded, a domain 
valorisation—as process of abstraction—must always ultimately refer back to. In this sense, the 
socio-ecological concretion of the law of value is always characterised by a dialectal relation of non-
identity between internally related moments of abstraction, meaning, and life-making, all of them 
simultaneously rooted in everyday practical activity. Through this process, the intricate—often 
baroque (Echeverría 2011)—cultural, political, and ecological forms of contemporary capitalist 
landscapes develop. And it is here where both political openings and dangers must be sought.   
For this reason, attention to what, drawing from Ivan Illich, I have called ‘the vernacular’ is 
of critical importance: it constitutes the basic cultural-material grounds for the composition of 
historically and geographically situated anti-capitalist politics. As mentioned above, we need to 
approach our situation from that which is negated by the mechanisms of capitalist value and 
power—abstract labour and abstract social nature (Moore, 2015)—, a dimension that nevertheless 
must continue to exist as the locus of the meaning-making processes that ultimately drive social 
reproduction at its base. Drawing on anthropological theories of value, I have suggested that Marx’s 
theory of value might offer some core elements for a symbolic-materialist approach to this field; by 
rooting cultural values in material practices, and delineating the relational fields in which these 
practices acquire and realise their cultural meanings and orientations. This approach might allow us 
to connect more clearly cultural values to the specific ecologies and geographies through which they 
are reproduced.  
These openings offered by value theory might help us sketch the myriad social-relational 
fields in which socio-ecological reproduction is embedded, and grasp the practical-material and 
relational conditions for the moral and cultural values that permeate our social metabolism at every 
point. However, it is important to understand that these values and their attendant ecologies and 
geographies emerge within, and develop through—sometimes beyond—the geographies and 
ecologies of capital (and vice versa). In other words, what we are everywhere confronted with are 
not discreet ‘regimes of value’, but an overlapping multiplicity that under the hegemony of the 
capitalist value regime can only exist through the dialectic between value and use-value. Marx’s 
critique still offers us a unique avenue to understand this—and act upon it. 
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Notes
1 The arguments in this paper draw from the ongoing discussions within the rich field of critical readings of 
Marxian value theory—a stream of debates arguably stretching from Isaak Rubin’s Essays on Marx’s Theory 
of Value (1973 [1928]), but running through the discussions associated to the German Neue Marx-Lektüre 
(see Heinrich, 2007; Bellofiore and Redolfi Riva, 2015), and, in the anglophone world, those associated with 
the Open Marxist school (e.g. Bonefeld, 2014; Holloway, 2010), the Conference of Socialist Economists (e.g. 
Clarke, 1991; Elson, 2016), among many others (Postone, 1993; Murray, 2016). Although itself immensely 
variegated, this field of discussions is characterised by the centring and development of Marx’s understanding 
of value as an historically specific form of the social character of labour (or, in other words, of society’s 
metabolic relation to nature).  
2 In Marx’s theory there is a distinction between value—a relational property emergent from private (not 
directly social) character of capitalist labour—and exchange-value, as the expression of this relation in 
exchange.  
3 Among the exceptions, if somewhat different in orientations, is the work of Burkett (2014, ch 7), and more 
recently, of Jason W. Moore (e.g. 2015) and Kohei Saito (2017).  
4 Milpa is the main traditional agroecosystem in Mesoamerica, based on the association of maize, beans, 
and squash.  
5 For Echeverría the term ‘natural form’ “does not make reference to a ‘substance’ or ‘human nature’ of 
metaphysical validity, against which the ‘value form’ would be ‘in sin’; nor to the rootedness of the human in 
Nature’s normativity, in relation to which the ‘value form’ would be a mere artifice lacking any basis. It 
refers exclusively to the fact that that which is human, being in essence ‘artificial’, non-natural, that is, 
contingent, self-founded, must always constitute its forms in an act … of ‘trans-naturalisation’, act that 
makes them forms constituted on the basis of proto-forms located in nature, the same which, 
‘determinately negated’, remain as its substance.” (Echeverría, 2011:281, my translation). 
6 I make the last revisions to this manuscript amid a global pandemic that, among other things, has forced 
valorisation to take, for the time being, a backseat to the preservation of life. One of the notable 
consequences of this temporary unsettling in our hierarchies of value has been the sudden inversion of 
hegemonic notions of which work is valuable/essential, and which expendable. This speak directly to 
Turner’s point here. 
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